We study a heterogeneous agents model that combines matching frictions in the labor market with incomplete asset markets and nominal rigidities. Workers can experience job terminations that send them into very short term unemployment or more serious job terminations that a longer search process. We show that an increase in job uncertainty decreases aggregate demand which lowers hiring and therefore produces even more job uncertainty and potentially a deep recession. The ampli…cation mechanism is small when asset markets are complete, prices are ‡exible or unemployment is predominantly short term. With a moderate and empirically plausible amount of change in the composition of unemployment, the model can account for the amplitude of the increase in unemployment during the Great Recession, for the increase in unemployment duration, and for much of the shift and movement along the Beveridge curve.
Introduction
The Great Recession has witnessed unprecedented increases in the level and the duration of unemployment in the United States. The unemployment rate in September 2012 remains close to 8 percent having surpassed 10 percent in late 2009 and the number of unemployed workers who have been out of work for 6 months or more now accounts for more than 40 percent of total unemployment, see Figure 1 .
1 Much attention has already been devoted to examining these developments, 2 but relatively little work has explored the idea that the labor market crisis itself may have been an important source of the recession. Here we show that shocks that impact on future job prospects can be ampli…ed signi…cantly when a vicious circle of feedback arises between the labor market and the goods market. Such an ampli…cation mechanism occurs when unemployment risk has a large impact on the desire for household savings, when aggregate demand has a strong impact on …rms'hiring decisions, and when at least some fraction of the unemployed face more di¢ cult matching problems. We argue that all of these circumstances are relevant for the Great Recession and thus that the labor market ampli…cation mechanism is key for understanding the depth of the Great Recession.
A menu of frictions interact in our model. First, households face idiosyncratic unemployment risk and asset markets are incomplete. Speci…cally, we assume that households have access only to a nominal state-non-contingent bond and must obey a borrowing limit. Actual asset markets may be more sophisticated than this but the key assumption is that households cannot fully insure against idiosyncratic risks originating in the labor market. Market incompleteness induces an incentive for households to engage in precautionary savings as a means of self-insurance. Secondly, …rms are monopolistically competitive and face nominal rigidities in price setting which we model using a state-contingent pricing set-up, see Rotemberg (1982) . The presence of nominal rigidities implies that changes in aggregate demand are more likely to be re ‡ected in labor demand than when prices are fully ‡exible. Third, in the tradition of DiamondMortensen-Pissarides we assume that the labor market is characterized by matching frictions which prevent unemployed workers and …rms with vacancies from being instantaneously and costlessly paired. We extend the standard matching model by allowing for two unemployment states which di¤er in the search e¢ ciency. In particular, we assume that unemployed workers may either experience very short term unemployment or longer term unemployment 3 . The …rst state induces little risk while the second state produces worse labor market prospects. 4 We investigate the impact of a temporary increase in involuntary job separations. 5 An important aspect of this labor market deterioration is that currently employed workers face idiosyncratic risk about which matches will be resolved. Employed workers react to this risk by increasing their desired precautionary savings and unemployed workers, realizing the future job …nding opportunities have worsened, may likewise increase their savings rate. This mechanism is stronger the larger share of the job separations that are associated with longer term unemployment. In response to lower demand for their products, …rms have an incentive to cut prices which partially o¤sets the fall in demand but nominal rigidities reduce this incentive. At the same time, when fewer of the unemployed match very e¢ ciently with vacancies, the incentive of …rms to post more vacancies is curbed. Fewer vacancies, in turn, decrease the job …nding rate and therefore the expected income loss associated with unemployment. Hence, a vicious circle may appear in which deteriorating job prospects trigger lower demand which worsens the labor market outlook even further. Under these circumstances, job uncertainty can produce a 3 Farber (2012) also highlights the role of the increase of unemployment duration during the Great Recession.
4 Ravn (2008) and Hornstein (2011) model heterogeneity in search e¢ ciency in a similar fashion.
5 Elsby, Hobijn andŞahin (2010) document that the in ‡ow rate into unemployment did increase quite substantially during the early parts of the Great Recession. They also show that most of this is due to a spike in the layo¤ rate. Hall (2010) also stresses the role of job losses in the early parts of the Great Recession.
deep recession.
To investigate the importance of the ampli…cation mechanism during the Great Recession, we feed into a calibrated version of the model processes for job separations and for the share of job separations that send workers to the two unemployment state which match the US time series for permanent layo¤s and the share of unemployed workers who have been out of work for 6 months or more. The resulting calibration of the size of the shock to the share of less search e¢ cient workers is consistent with the estimates of Barlevy (2011 Barlevy ( ) andŞahin et al (2012 regarding the importance of mis-match during the Great Recession. 6 The model is shown to produce a large recession in response to these shocks and we …nd an increase in the unemployment rate and a decrease in vacancies that closely resemble their empirical counterparts. This also means that the model produces the movement along and shift in the Beveridge curve observed in the US during the Great Recession.
We conduct an extensive robustness analysis of our results using a simpli…ed model in which we impose a no-borrowing constraint on the households. Although this model features no wealth inequality in equilibrium, we …nd that it produces results that are quite similar to the benchmark model. The ampli…cation mechanism is neutralized when either prices are ‡exible or asset markets are complete. In the latter case, an increase in job separations have limited impact on aggregate demand which reduces the adverse impact of the worsening labor market conditions. When prices are ‡exible, …rms have a strong incentive to cut prices when aggregate demand declines which moderates very signi…cantly the recessionary impact of the increase in job separations. We show that it is the interaction between precautionary savings motives and nominal rigidities that produces the ampli…cation mechanism. We also …nd that it is crucial 6 Barlevy (2011) estimates the extent mis-match from the shift in the Beveridge curve post-August 2008. Daly et al (2012) instead use the instability of the Beveridge curve during the Great Recession to derive an estimate of the change in the natural rate of unemployment. Şahin et al (2012) posit a model composed of many distinct labor markets and use this to measure mis-match unemployment. In an application to US data, they use dispersion in unemployment across industries, occupations, education and geography to estimate the extent of mis-match.
to allow for a change in the composition of unemployment and in particular for a drying up of very short term unemployment. When unemployment duration is short, an increase in job separations has limited impact on aggregate demand and …rms have a strong incentive to post vacancies when unemployment rises which reduces the adverse impact of an adverse shock to job separations.
We also investigate the importance of wage setting. Following Shimer (2012), the benchmark model assumes that the real wage is …xed. We replace this assumption with a Nash bargaining model and …nd that the results are sensitive to the assumptions made regarding workers'outside option should the partners disagree during the bargaining process. If a failed bargaining processes can send workers into both unemployment states, nominal wages fall and the ampli…cation mechanism does not arise. Assuming alternatively that a failed bargaining process sends workers into the high search e¢ ciency state only, the results under Nash bargaining are extremely similar to the benchmark model that assumes constant real wages.
The paper is related to the seminal contribution of Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) . In their analysis, matches are endogenously terminated and they examine how productivity shocks are propagated due to matching frictions and household savings decisions. We instead focus on the interaction between matching frictions, precautionary savings and nominal rigidities.
There is also a clear link to Ljungqvist and Sargent's (1998, 2004) theory of turbulence where the interaction between search decisions and the bene…t system interact. In our model, bene…ts are also an important component but mainly due to their impact on workers perceived income losses during unemployment and therefore on precautionary savings.
A number of other recent papers have examined aggregate ‡uctuations in incomplete markets settings. Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2002) and Krusell et al (2009) both study models that introduce frictional labor markets in a general equilibrium incomplete markets model with idiosyncratic risk. The former authors compute the welfare costs of business cycles while the latter authors examine how labor market uncertainty in ‡uences inequality and how imperfect insurance a¤ects unemployment and other labor market outcomes. Krusell, Mukoyama and Şahin (2011) and Challe and Ragot (2012) Our analysis combines nominal rigidities, heterogeneous agents, and frictional labor markets and illustrates how the combination of these frictions produces new insights regarding the aggregate and distributional e¤ects of shocks that originate in the labor market.
Also related to our analysis is a stream of recent papers that examine the impact of uncertainty shocks. In our model, asset market incompleteness implies that shocks to job termination rates produce changes in idiosyncratic uncertainty and we …nd that this is important for understanding the impact of labor market shocks on aggregate demand. Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) suggest that policy uncertainty may have contributed signi…cantly to the Great Recession. Closer to our analysis, Schalle (2012) investigates the impact of idiosyncratic productivity volatility shocks on unemployment in a directed search model with heterogeneous …rms. He …nds that the uncertainty e¤ects induced by the volatility shocks can explain some of the rise in unemployment but not its persistence. Basu and Bundick (2012) analyze the e¤ects of aggregate uncertainty shocks dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a representative consumer. Consistently with our analysis of the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty, they …nd that nominal rigidities amplify the impact of uncertainty shocks. Basu and Bundick (2012) also demonstrate that a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate may further amplify 7 The latter of these papers do not explicitly model labor market matching. None of these papers allow for nominal rigidities.
the impact of uncertainty shocks. Related to this, Rendahl (2012) shows how news shocks can generate severe recessions in a zero lower bound environment in a model with frictional labor markets. We will abstract from issues related to a lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model economy. In Section 3 we study a version of the model in which there is no wealth inequality in equilibrium.
Section 4 presents the results from the main model. Section 5 concludes and summarizes.
The Model Economy
The economy is inhabited by households, …rms which are owned by entrepreneurs, and by a government which is in charge of monetary and …scal policy. Three key friction come together in the model. The labor market is characterized by Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching frictions which we extend by introducing di¤erential matching prospects across unemployed workers. As in Bewley (1977) and Aiyagari (1994) , asset markets are incomplete. Speci…cally, following Krusell and Smith (1997) , the model features idiosyncratic and aggregate risk in an incomplete markets set-up. Firms are monopolistically competitive and set prices in an environment with nominal rigidities in price setting. We adopt the set-up of Rotemberg (1982) where …rms face quadratic costs of adjusting nominal prices.
Households. There is a continuum of mass 1 of in…nitely lived households indexed by i 2 (0; 1).
Households have rational expectations and maximize the expected present value of their utility streams. A household is either working or unemployed and looking for a job. Unemployed workers di¤er in the e¢ ciency of the matching technology that they face. This feature produces heterogeneity across unemployed workers in the expected duration of unemployment spells.
Asset markets are incomplete which produces an incentive for precautionary savings to insure against unemployment and other shocks. Di¤erences in labor market histories and asset market incompleteness in combination produce wealth inequality across households.
Households consume a basket of consumption goods varieties:
where c j i;t denotes household i's consumption of goods of variety j and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods. Variety j is purchased at the nominal price P j;t .
It follows that household i's demand for variety j is given as:
where P t is the price index associated with the consumption basket de…ned in (1):
A household that is employed in period t works full-time hours (normalized to one unit), receives a real wage w t , pays a lump-sum social security tax T h t , and experiences a job termination with probability x;t 1. A fraction r;t of the workers that experience a job termination make a transition to unemployment state r = s; l, s;t + l;t = 1.
An unemployed household in state r receives (gross of taxes) unemployment bene…ts r 0 and …nds a new job with probability r;t . We assume that l;t < s;t and will therefore, slightly imprecisely, refer to the two groups of unemployed workers as short-and long-term unemployed. 8 We assume that s l so that the risk of a longer unemployment spell is not o¤set by higher bene…ts. One interpretation of the two types of unemployed workers is that type l unemployed workers are mis-matched and face a more demanding job search process. An alternative interpretation is that type s unemployed are "switch-unemployed" who face very short-term unemployment. The model as such is silent on which of these two interpretations is the right one but our calibration favors the latter.
Job terminations occur at the end of the period while new job matches are formed at the beginning of the period. Households are informed about the job loss probabilities at the 8 In expectations, a type s unemployed worker will face shorter unemployment duration of an unemployment spell than a type l individual. Ex-post, however, some "short-term" unemployed workers may face long unemployment spells and some "long-term" unemployed workers will …nd jobs fast.
beginning of the period and therefore have within-period perfect foresight about the share of currently employed workers who will lose their jobs and about the share of these that become short-and long-term unemployed. However, households face idiosyncratic uncertainty about both the identity of the workers who lose their jobs, about the unemployment state should they lose their job, and about future job separation rates.
Households have access to a state non-contingent bond which carries a (gross) nominal interest rate of R t . We impose a borrowing constraint by assuming that there is a utility cost of holding debt. 9 Let b h i;t denote household i's holding of bonds at the end of period t. We assume that there is a utility cost function, ', and a debt limit b 0 so that
This implies that no household chooses b
Households face a sequence of budget constraints:
where b h i; 1 > b is given and t denotes the net in ‡ation rate in period t, (1 + t ) = P t =P t 1 . n i;t indicates the employment status of household i at date t while I r;t indicates the unemployment state status:
0 if individual i is unemployed in period t 1 if individual i is employed in period t 
Households maximize subject to the budget constraint in equation (5) setting n i;t = 1. u (c i;t )
is a concave utility function. V u;r i (b i;t 1 ; S t ) is the value for an unemployed household who is faced with state r = s; l unemployment. 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, and E t is the conditional expectations operator. x;t r;t is the probability that a worker who is employed at the beginning of the period makes a transition to unemployment state r and P r=s;l x;t r;t 1 r;t+1 is the probability of not being employed at the beginning of period t + 1.
A type r unemployed worker faces the problem:
subject to the budget constraint in equation (5) setting n i;t = 0 and I r;t = 1. > 0 denotes the utility of leisure enjoyed by an unemployed household (having normalized the utility of leisure of employed households to zero). As a matter of consistency, we will make the assumption that
S for all b h and S so that no employed household has an incentive to voluntarily leave their current job. Under the condition that s;t+1 > l;t+1 the condition that
for all b and S.
10 10 The formulation of the unemployed workers'problem in equation (7) assumes that there are no ‡ows between the two unemployment states during unemployment. However, all workers face identical job prospects upon employment. The …rst of these assumptions is easily relaxed and immaterial for the results as long as the ‡ow out of unemployment is su¢ ciently small for type l workers relative to type s workers.
Entrepreneurs. Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms indexed by j 2 (0; 1) which are owned by risk neutral entrepreneurs. We let < 1 denote the measure of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs discount utility at the rate and make decisions on the pricing of their goods, on vacancy postings, and on their consumption and savings policies. In return for managing (and owning) the …rm, they are the sole claimants to its pro…ts (but will also have to stand ready to cover losses). We assume that entrepreneurs can save but face a no-borrowing constraint. This no-borrowing constraint implies that the entrepreneur …nances hiring costs through retained earnings.
11
Output is produced by according to a linear technology:
where n j;t denotes entrepreneur j's input of labor which is purchased from the households.
Firms are assumed to be su¢ ciently large (i.e. the mass of entrepreneurs is small relative to the mass of households) that there are no indivisibility problems associated with the full-time hours assumption made earlier.
Following Rotemberg (1982) we assume that there are nominal rigidities in the form of quadratic costs of price adjustment. Given risk neutrality, entrepreneurs set prices to maximize the present discounted value of pro…ts:
s P j;t+s P t+s mc j;t+s y j;t+s 2 P j;t+s P j;t+s 1 P j;t+s 1 2 y t+s !
subject to:
Equation (10) is the demand for goods variety j. y t , which is de…ned formally below, can be interpreted as aggregate real income. In equation (9) 0 indicates the size of costs of changing prices with = 0 corresponding to ‡exible prices. mc j;t denotes real marginal costs.
11 In the stationary equilibrium, < 1= (R= ((1 + ))) so entrepreneurs will be borrowing constrained.
The …rst-order condition for this problem is given as:
(1 ) + mc j;t P t P j;t y j;t = P t P j;t 1 P j;t P j;t 1 P j;t 1 y t + E t P j;t+1 P 2 j;t P j;t+1 P j;t P j;t P t y t+1 (11)
In a symmetric equilibrium, which will be the focus of our analysis, this simpli…es to:
Firms hire labor in a frictional labor market. The law of motion for employment in …rm j is given as:
where h j;t denotes hires made by …rm j in period t. The number of hires in turn is given as:
where v j;t is the number of vacancies posted by the …rm and f;t is the job …lling probability. We assume that …rms are su¢ ciently large that f;t can be interpreted as the fraction of vacancies that lead to a match. 12 The cost of posting a vacancy is given by > 0. Therefore, real marginal costs are given as:
which incorporates the fact that hiring in period t impacts on future marginal costs through future hiring cost savings.
Finally, the budget constraint of entrepreneurs can be expressed as:
where b e j; 1 0 is given, d j;t denotes entrepreneur j's consumption in period t and b e j;t their bond purchases in period t. Condition (16) imposes the no-borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs. T e t are employer contributions to social security.
Labor Market. The matching technology is given as:
where m t denotes the measure of matches between …rms (vacancies) and unemployed workers at date t, u r;t is the measure of type r unemployed workers at date t and v t is the measure of vacancies posted by the …rms. > 0, and 2 (0; 1) are constant parameters. The parameter q 2 (0; 1] is the probability that a type l unemployed worker is searching for a job at date t.
When q < 1, type l workers are less likely to …nd a job than type s unemployed workers and face longer expected unemployment duration.
Given the matching technology, the job …lling probability and the job …nding probabilities are given as:
where t = v t =u t denotes labor market tightness, u t is the measure of unemployed workers.
Importantly, as long as q < 1, the job …lling rate depends negatively on the share of the longer term unemployed because these workers match less e¢ ciently with vacancies than short term unemployed workers.
13
The laws of motion of the stocks of employed and unemployed workers are given as:
u r;t = 1 r;t u r;t 1 + r;t x;t n t 1
Our candidates for stochastic shocks to the economy are exogenous changes in the job separation rate, x;t , and in s;t , which determines the share of workers a¤ected job terminations 13 When q = 1 , 1 (1 q) u l;t =u t = 1 so this term drops out.
that become short-term unemployed. We assume that:
where x ; s 2 (0; 1) are the long-run levels of job termination and the share of short-term unemployed, respectively, while x ; s 2 ( 1; 1) denote the persistence of shocks to the job termination rate and to the share of short-term unemployed. It is assumed that " t N (0; V " )
where
We experiment with alternative assumptions regarding wage setting. All schemes that we consider are required to be consistent with a non-negative surplus of any worker-…rm matches so that none of the partners have an incentive to terminate an existing match voluntarily. In our benchmark model, we assume that real wages are constant, w t = w. 14 We examine whether the results are robust to assuming that wages are instead determined according to a Nash bargaining model. In the face of wealth heterogeneity, Nash bargaining introduces worker-speci…c wages which complicates the analysis very signi…cantly.
Government. The government is in charge of monetary and …scal policies. We assume that the government balances the budget period by period which means that:
which re ‡ects the lump-sum nature of the social security taxes.
Monetary policy is speci…ed by a rule for the short-term nominal interest rate. We assume that:
where R is the long-run nominal interest rate target, is the in ‡ation target, and denotes the elasticity of the nominal interest rate to deviations of in ‡ation from its target.
Equilibrium. We focus upon a recursive equilibrium in which households act competitively taking all prices for given while …rms act as monopolistic competitors setting the price of their own variety taking all other prices for given. In equilibrium, …rms are symmetric because there are no idiosyncratic productivity shocks, prices are set in a state-contingent manner, and because they are assumed to be su¢ ciently large that they all hire the same number of workers. 15 We let p j;t = P j;t =P t denote the relative price of …rm j's product. Symmetry implies that this relative price equals 1 in equilibrium.
Households are instead heterogeneous and di¤er in their labor market status and in their wealth.
In equilibrium, aggregate savings equal zero but, since wealth matters for savings choices, the wealth distribution is an aggregate state variable which impacts both on household and on entrepreneurial choices. We let t = (b t 1 ; e t ) denote the distribution of agents over asset levels and employment states, b t = b where e it indicates the labor market status of household i (whether employed or unemployed in state r = s; l). 16 We let d t denote the associated density of the joint distribution of assets and labor market status. The relevant state vector is then de…ned as S t = t ; x;t ; s;t .
De…nition 1 A recursive monopolistic competition equilibrium is de…ned as a distribution of wealth (b; e), pricing kernels (w (S) ; (S)), decision rules c
and W (b e ), and government policies (T (S) ; R (S)) such that (i) given the pricing kernel, the government policies, and the aggregate and individual states, the household decision rules solve the households problem;
15 Firms are also assumed to be su¢ ciently big that there the full time hours assumption does not give rise to any indivisibility problems.
(ii) given the pricing kernel, government policies, and the aggregate state, the entrepreneur decision rules solve the entrepreneurs'problem and p j (b e ; S) J j=0 = 1 for all j and all (b e ; S);
(iii) asset and goods market clear:
(iv) the government budget constraint is satis…ed and the nominal interest is given by the policy rule in equation (28); Solution Method. Solving our main model is computationally challenging because of the presence of wealth heterogeneity and aggregate uncertainty. As discussed by Krusell and Smith (1998) , the essence of the problem is the presence of a large-dimensional aggregate state that includes the entire wealth distribution. We follow their computational strategy, which involves an update of the individuals'beliefs on the laws of motion of aggregate variables in each step of the algorithm. Thus, the individuals'optimization problem needs to be solved many times.
Krusell and Smith (1998) do so by using a global solution algorithm. In our case, this would be prohibitively slow given that -even aside from the wealth distribution-our model has a relatively large number of aggregate state variables that are all continuous.
17
To speed up the solution of the individuals' problem, we develop a perturbation-based method that is hardly slowed down by the presence many state variables. Unlike standard …rst-order perturbation approaches, however, our method fully preserves the nonlinearity of the individuals'policy rules in individual wealth, which crucially a¤ects precautionary savings behavior. This is achieved by perturbing around the savings path followed by an agent that is hit by a sequence of idiosyncratic shocks that keep her in the same employment state for many 17 Krusell and Smith (1998) reduce the computational burden by assuming that there is only a "good" and a "bad" aggregate state. Moreover, the presence of matching frictions and nominal rigidities increases the number of aggregate state variables relative to their model.
periods. 18 The algorithm allows for straightforward implementation using standard perturbation software and is described in detail in the appendix. The method builds on the algorithm of Reiter (2009) Before turning to the general version of the model, we …nd it instructive to examine a special case where we impose that b = 0. The no-borrowing constraint implies that all households hold zero wealth in equilibrium so that the wealth distribution no longer is an aggregate state variable. We can therefore compute the equilibrium in a simple manner using a standard pertubation method. The relative simplicity of the numerical procedure also means that this version of the model lends itself to a rigorous robustness analysis. Although this model features no equilibrium wealth inequality, its key mechanisms are much the same as in the general version that allows for borrowing apart from the fact that there are no di¤erential impact on agents according to their wealth.
Calibration
The calibration targets and parameter values are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 . One model period corresponds to a calendar month. The household utility function is assumed to be given as:
The end points of the path are pinned down by steady-state conditions, resembling the extended path algorithm of Gagnon and Taylor (1990) . 19 An earlier reference is Campbell (1998) , who applies a similar method to a model with heterogeneous …rms. 20 Another di¤erence is that the algorithm of Reiter (2009) does not require a simulation step.
and we set = 1:5. This value is in the mid-range of empirical estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1995) , Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988) , and many others who have examined either household data or aggregate time series. determines the degree of risk aversion which matters for the household savings response to uncertainty and this is important in our model.
We assume an annual real interest rate of 3 percent and set the subjective discount factor equal to 0.993 for both households and entrepreneurs. This value is low relative to standard representative agent models but because of idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets, agents have a strong incentive to engage in precautionary savings and a low real interest rate is required to induce zero savings in equilibrium.
We target an unemployment rate of 5 percent and a 15 percent share of long term unemployed (unemployed workers who have been out of work for 6 months or more) in the stationary equilibrium. These targets are close to the mean statistics for the United States in the post-1970 period. Following Rothstein (2011), we target a monthly hazard rate from unemployment to employment for a newly unemployed workers of 40 percent and a 30 percent monthly hazard rate for workers who have been unemployed for 26 weeks or more. These targets imply a steady-state job loss probability, x , of 2:95 percent per month, that s , the share of workers who experience a job loss that enter the pool of high search e¢ ciency unemployment, equals 35 percent, and that the relative search e¢ ciency of the longer term unemployed, q, is 50:2 percent. Given the calibration, we favor the interpretation of the multiple unemployment states that associated states s with switch-unemployment, i.e. unemployment that has very short duration.
We assume that the matching function elasticity to unemployment is equal to 50 percent ( = 0:5), and normalize = 1. , the vacancy cost parameter, is calibrated by targeting an average hiring cost of 4:5 percent of the quarterly wage bill. Given other parameters, this implies that = 0:18.
We calibrate the bene…t levels, s and l , by targeting estimates of the consumption loss during unemployment reported by Browning and Crossley (2001) . Studying Canadian data, these authors …nd that consumption drops on average 14 percent upon a permanent job loss.
They report that there is a lot of dispersion across workers with 25 percent su¤ering no loss while the worst hit 10 percent experience a consumption loss of 50 percent. In the the model, the borrowing limit implies that all households hold zero savings in equilibrium and therefore that consumption equals ‡ow (after tax) income. Thus, in the stationary equilibrium, 35 percent (65 percent) of the population would su¤er a consumption loss that would correspond to the di¤erence between the real wage and s ( l ). In order to moderate slightly the impact of the no-borrowing constraint, we assume that s = 0:925w and that l = 0:84w (where w is the real wage) which imply an average consumption loss upon unemployment of just below 14 percent as estimated by Browning and Crossley (2001) but implies less variance across the unemployed agents.
We set the average mark-up equal to 20 percent which implies that , the elasticity of substitution between goods, is equal to 6. , the parameter that determines the importance of price adjustment costs, is calibrated to match price adjustment frequency of 5 months. This value is conservative but close to the value estimated by Bils and Klenow (2004) . 21 This implies that = 142:86. We assume that the government's in ‡ation target = 1 so that it pursues price stability and we set = 1:5, a conventional value in the new Keynesian literature.
Finally, we estimate the parameters of the stochastic processes that determine the persistence and volatility of the job separation rate and of the share of high search e¢ ciency unemployed workers from time-series data for layo¤s and the share of workers who have been unemployed for 6 months or more. We …nd estimates of x = 0:9774 and s = 0:7926. this implies a half-life of job separation shocks of 30 months while shocks to the share of short term unemployed die out very fast.
21 To be precise, we calibrate by exploiting the equivalence between the log-linearized Phillips curve implied by our model and the Phillips curve implied by the Calvo model.
Results
The Impact of Shocks. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the impact of a one standard deviation increase in job separations and a one standard deviation drop in the share of "switch" unemployed, respectively. We report the impact on the unemployment rate, on the share of unemployed workers who have been out of work for 6 months or more, on average unemployment duration, on the job …nding rate, on vacancies, and, …nally, on the real interest rate and the in ‡ation rate.
An increase in the job separation rate puts upward pressure on the unemployment rate.
At the same time, there is a signi…cant drop in the vacancy index which falls by 4 percent on impact and recovers only gradually over time. Thus, the increase in unemployment produced by the increase in layo¤s is propagated though fewer vacancies which together imply a signi…cant worsening of the labor market outlook and a large and very persistent decrease in the job …nding rate. An important reason for why the increase in job separations spill over to vacancies derives from the impact on households'savings desire. Recall that employed agents have an incentive to self-insure against unemployment risk because of incomplete markets and because the increase in the job separation rate induces idiosyncratic job risk. We notice that the real interest rate drops very signi…cantly. This re ‡ects mainly that a lower real interest rate is needed to clear the asset market because of the precautionary savings motive just mentioned. In conjunction this produces a large and persistent in the level and duration of unemployment. Quantitatively, an increase in the monthly job separation rate from its stationary state value of 2.95 percent to 2.99 percent leads to an increase in the unemployment rate from 5 percent to 5.2 percent and an increase in the average unemployment duration from 2.78 months to 2.83 months. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of an one standard deviation decrease in the share of job separations that send workers very short term unemployment holding constant the job separation rate. This shock has a large impact on the economy which is qualitatively similar to that of a layo¤ shock but quantitatively much larger. Less search e¢ cient workers take on average longer to …nd a job than switch unemployed workers and experience a much larger consumption cost of unemployment. Hence, the drop in the share of switch unemployment produces a strong desire for precautionary savings amongst employed workers which is re ‡ected in a large drop in the real interest rate. This reduces goods demand and …rms realize that vacancies are harder to …ll because of the preponderance of low search e¢ ciency workers amongst the unemployed.
Hence, vacancies fall very signi…cantly which leads to a large drop in the job …nding rate. The decrease in the job …nding rate and the lower search e¢ ciency of the stock of unemployed workers jointly imply that the unemployment rate and the average unemployment duration both increase substantially.
In summary, the benchmark model induces a strong interaction between labor, asset and goods market which produces an ampli…cation mechanism. In order to understand the sources of this mechanism better, we …nd it useful to compare the results of the benchmark economy to two alternative economies. In the …rst alternative economy we assume that prices are ‡exible, = 0. In this economy, there is a much weaker transmission of shocks from households'demand for goods to …rms'demand for labor since …rms have a strong incentive to cut prices in response to weak goods demand. It is therefore useful to examine this alternative economy to understand how labor market frictions and idiosyncratic risk interact with goods market frictions.
In the second alternative economy we assume households can insure fully against idiosyncratic shocks. This is equivalent to assuming that households are organized in a single family which insures all idiosyncratic employment risk. The family's budget constraint is given as:
where we use that intra-household insurance implies that consumption levels are equalized across households. This economy features no idiosyncratic risk and while aggregate shocks in the labor market still impacts on the economy, the precautionary savings channel against idiosyncratic risk is neutralized. Figure 4 demonstrates the impact of the job separation shock in the benchmark economy and in the economies where either prices are ‡exible but asset markets are incomplete or asset markets are complete but prices are sticky. The initial increase in unemployment in the complete markets model is almost the same as in the benchmark model but under complete markets unemployment falls monotonically from the second month after the increase in layo¤s.
Moreover, the peak increase in unemployment in the complete markets model is less than half of what is observed in the benchmark model. The reason from this is clear from the real interest rate path which shows that the demand channel is neutralized almost immediately when asset markets are complete. Therefore, apart from the …rst month, …rms take advantage of the ease of hiring that results from high unemployment and post more vacancies. This implies that the job …nding rate is almost una¤ected by the increase in job terminations and the ampli…cation mechanism is almost totally neutralized.
The ‡exible price cum incomplete markets model produces very similar results to the model with complete markets cum sticky prices with the main di¤erence being that the e¤ects are somewhat more persistent in the ‡exible price economy than in the complete markets model. In this economy, while the job separation shock induces idiosyncratic risk, …rms respond to lower demand by cutting prices. This implies a less signi…cant impact on vacancy postings which induces, in turn, less idiosyncratic risk than in the benchmark model. In equilibrium, we …nd that the high job separation rate under these circumstances have very limited e¤ects on the economy beyond the direct one that derive from more employed workers losing their jobs.
The ampli…cation mechanism in the benchmark model is even stronger in response to the shock to the share of switch-unemployed, see Figure 5 . Here we …nd almost no impact on unemployment or any other variable when either prices are ‡exible or asset markets are complete.
In the complete markets economy, a fall in the share of very search e¢ cient workers increases the expected income loss to the household sector associated with the measure of agents in unemployment state l. This obviously lowers demand from these households and makes it slightly more costly for …rms to …ll vacancies because of the lower search e¢ ciency of this type of unemployment. Quantitatively, however, the demand channel is of only minor importance since there is no motive for insurance against idiosyncratic risk and this neutralizes most of the e¤ects that arise in the benchmark model. When prices are ‡exible but asset markets incomplete, the precautionary savings motive remains but there is little transmission mechanism from goods demand to vacancies which removes most of the ampli…cation mechanism.
We conclude from this that it is the combination of incomplete markets and sticky prices that produce an ampli…cation mechanism in which deteriorating labor market prospects produce low demand for goods which in turn leads to weak labor demand thereby creating a vicious circle.
When asset markets are complete, there is little impact on goods demand while ‡exible prices neutralize the channel that goes from goods demand to labor demand.
A Great Recession Experiment. We now turn to a Great Recession experiment. We derive estimates of the sequences of innovations to job termination and to the fraction of workers that ‡ow into high search e¢ ciency unemployment, (" x;t ; " s;t )
2012:1 t=2007:1 , by matching the observed US time-series on layo¤s and the number of unemployed workers who have been out of work for 6 months or more (relative to the labor force). We back out these shocks for the sample period from January 2007 until January 2012. In order to avoid having too erratic shocks, we smooth both data series with a 4 months moving average …lter. We then feed the resulting shock processes into the model economy and simulate the economy in response to this particular sequence of shocks.
The …rst two panels of Figure 6 show the path of layo¤s and the fraction of long term unemployed that we target. The other two panels illustrate the time-series of unemployment and vacancies observed in US data together with the corresponding time-series implied by the benchmark model. 22 We also show the corresponding time-series generated by the model when assuming either that there is no change in the composition of the unemployed, prices are ‡exible, or asset markets are complete. We initialize the unemployment rate at the steady-state and we report vacancies in terms of percentage deviations from steady-state.
The benchmark model reproduces almost exactly the observed unemployment rate. As in the actual data, unemployment starts increasing fast from early 2008 and peaks around 10 percent in late 2009 -early 2010. The model implies a slightly lower unemployment rate in the 22 We show these time-series in terms of deviations from their pre-crisis levels.
post-2011 sample than the actual value observed in the US but the di¤erence is not large. One might think that this success in accounting for the increase in unemployment during the Great Recession derives from the fact that we are feeding the observed layo¤s into the model but this intuition is not correct. In fact, when we assume either ‡exible prices or complete markets, we can account for a maximum 1.5 percentage point increase in unemployment, less than one third of the increase implied by the benchmark model. In order to evaluate the importance of the switch unemployment state we also report the outcome for unemployment and vacancies when we set (" s;t )
2012:1 t=2007:1 = 0 so that the economy is hit by job separation shocks only. In this case, we …nd a moderate increase in unemployment and a path of vacancies that are very similar to what the outcome under ‡exible prices. Thus, the increased risk for a low income state with long duration that is key for generating the ampli…cation mechanism.
Much discussion surrounding the Great Recession as focused on the relationship between unemployment and vacancies and the outward shift in the Beveridge curve that seems to have occurred since 2007. We illustrate this in Figure 7 . During the early parts of the recession, there was a marked decline in both vacancies and in the unemployment rate but later on the crisis, the recovery in vacancies has been associated with only a minor decline in unemployment consistent with the view that the Beveridge curve has shifted out. In Figure 7 we also report the joint trends in unemployment and vacancies implied by our model by combining the last two panels of Figure 6 . The versions of the model that assume either ‡exible prices, complete markets, or changes only in job separation rates fail to reproduce the joint decrease in unemployment and vacancies during the early parts of the recession and the implied relationship between unemployment and vacancies bear little resemblance if any to its empirical counterpart. The benchmark model instead performs extremely well at least until the later part of the recession where there is a more signi…cant rise in vacancies and drop in unemployment in the US data than predicted by the model. Nonetheless, the model is remarkably successful in accounting for joint movements in unemployment and vacancies.
Robustness
Nash Bargaining. We have so far has assumed that the real wage is …xed. The US experience during the Great Recession is by and large consistent with this assumption, see Shimer (2012).
Nonetheless, it is interesting to investigate the importance of this assumption. For that reason we now instead assume that wages are fully ‡exible and determined in a Nash bargaining game between entrepreneurs and workers. We will assume that the bargaining weights equal 0.5. 23 An issue that needs to be addressed relates to proper de…nition of the outside value of workers which depends on the assumptions made regarding the state of workers should the bargaining process be unsuccessful. We make two alternative assumptions. In the …rst case (Nash Bargaining I) we assume that an unsuccessful bargaining process sends workers into the two unemployment states with the same probabilities as workers that experience a job separation shock while under Nash Bargaining II we assume that workers ‡ow entirely into switch unemployment should the bargaining process break down. Figure 8 illustrates the impact on the real wage and on unemployment of shocks to the job termination rate and to the share of mis-matched unemployed workers under alternative wage setting assumptions. The impact of an increase in layo¤s on the level of unemployment is qualitatively similar under Nash Bargaining to the benchmark model but quantitatively smaller because the real wage falls under Nash bargaining. Moreover, since the share of mis-matched workers remain constant, the results are identical under the two alternative Nash bargaining assumptions. The moderation in the unemployment impact corresponds to a decrease in the peak increase in the unemployment rate of approximately 25 percent which is signi…cant but smaller than the corresponding decrease under ‡exible prices or complete markets.
The impact on the response to an decrease in the share of switch unemployment is more dramatic. Under Nash Bargaining I, the real wage falls su¢ ciently much that the unemployment rate actually drops after a decrease in the share of switch unemployed workers. 24 The reason is that the less search e¢ cient unemployment state is su¢ ciently bad that workers are willing to take a pay cut during the bargaining process to minimize the risk of ‡owing into this state.
Lower real wages in turn means that …rms post more vacancies which improves labor market prospects and lowers the level of unemployment. Under Nash Bargaining II workers instead feel less need to take a pay cut because they do not face an immediate risk of becoming low search e¢ cient unemployed. In this case, the fall in the real wage is much more moderate and the results are qualitatively similar to the benchmark model. 
Ampli…cation and Local Determinacy
The benchmark model displays a strong ampli…cation mechanism. It seems intuitively clear that the strength of the ampli…cation mechanism depends on the degree of risk aversion since the key channel of ampli…cation arises from the impact of idiosyncratic risk on household demand for goods. The larger is the degree of risk aversion, the stronger is the impact of job uncertainty because the precautionary risk response to labor market shocks is stronger. Another important parameter is the monetary policy response to in ‡ation because this determines the impact of shocks on the real interest rate which in turn impacts on demand.
We will now examine how the strength of the ampli…cation mechanism depends on these two parameters. Figure 10 illustrates the impact e¤ect of a joint shock to job separation and the share of switch-unemployed workers for a wide variety of di¤erent values of and . For each combination of and , we normalize the impact e¤ect with the impact e¤ect in the ‡exible price economy assuming the same value of . We …gure therefore illustrates the ampli…cation e¤ect. As expected, the ampli…cation mechanism is stronger the more risk averse agents are and the weaker is the monetary policy response to in ‡ation. In principle, the model can generate a very large ampli…cation mechanism for a su¢ ciently high degree of risk aversion and low degree of monetary policy response to in ‡ation. When there is little risk aversion and the nominal interest rate response to in ‡ation is very strong, the model generates the same impact of labor market shocks as under ‡exible prices. However, standard values of these parameters can generate a very signi…cant ampli…cation mechanism.
In this model, not all parameter combinations are compatible with a unique equilibrium. We …nd that there is a large zone of parameters for which the deterministic steady-state of the model is locally indeterminate, see Figure 10 . In this zone, many other types of equilibria including self-ful…lling sunspot type ‡uctuations may exist. Intuitively, when the deterministic steady-state is locally indeterminate, an expectation of future job uncertainty may be self-ful…lling because it can lead to a large drop in household demand for goods which leads …rms to decrease vacancy postings therefore spurring job uncertainty. We hesitate to speculate too much about the empirical relevance of such ‡uctuations but believe that this may an interesting further issue to explore. The indeterminacy region occurs when either agents are very risk averse or when the nominal interest rate response to variations in the in ‡ation rate is su¢ ciently weak. The ampli…cation mechanism is strongest the closer the parameters are to the indeterminacy region.
We notice that the Taylor principle is far from su¢ cient for guaranteeing local determinacy in this model.
Quantitative Results: General Model
The results discussed above are based upon imposing a no-borrowing constraint so that there is no wealth inequality in equilibrium. We now relax this assumption and allow for a positive debt limit. We retain the calibration of = 0:993 which in this economy implies a steady-state real interest rate of 4.33 percent annually.
Allowing for a positive debt level means that consumption losses due to unemployment no longer equal income losses because agents can save to smooth their consumption should they go through an unemployment spell. We therefore calibrate to match bene…t levels rather than consumption losses directly. We assume that s = l = 0:4w. Agents will still reduce consumption more should they make a transition from the high search e¢ ciency state to the normal unemployment state because of the impact on expected unemployment duration.
Moreover, the consumption loss due to unemployment will depend upon wealth. Hence, in the model there is a wide distribution of consumption losses after a job termination shock across agents.
We assume that the debt penalty function is given as:
We calibrate the debt limit 1 so that we match an average consumption loss of 14 percent when an agent experience a job separation. This implies a borrowing limit that corresponds to 1.9 months of salary. We also recalibrate the persistence of unemployment state shock so that it matches the persistence of the share of longer term unemployed workers. Figure 11 illustrates the consumption policy functions for the model. We plot these against wealth (and recall that the real wage is 0.8). In the model, the consumption loss for workers that experience a job loss is monotonically declining in wealth. A worker with a long employment spell save for precautionary reasons. The consumption loss is larger for households that ‡ow into longer term unemployment than for households that ‡ow to short term unemployment because of the di¤erences in the associated income losses. We also notice that savings provide a lot of insurance against unemployment for richer households. with a no-borrowing constraint. In particular,we still …nd a large ampli…cation of both types of shocks. One important di¤erence, though, is that there is a much large impact on the real interest rate (which must fall su¢ ciently that aggregate savings are zero in equilibrium).
E¤ectively, because of wealth heterogeneity, some households that are in debt are very reluctant not to increase their savings in response to increased uncertainty and worsening labor market conditions. Restoring equilibrium requires a sharp fall in the real interest rate. Hence, we …nd that idiosyncratic uncertainty has an even more important role in this model than in the simpler model analyzed above.
Conclusions and Summary
The great recession have witnessed a long and deep recession. While unemployment may …nally showing signs of declining, the level and duration and unemployment are still very high relative to historic standards. In this paper we have suggested that the uncertainty e¤ects of the job losses in the early part of the recession may have been an important factor behind the depth of the recession. In particular, we have argued that shocks in the labor market may have been ampli…ed signi…cantly due to the combination precautionary savings against the idiosyncratic risk associated with job uncertainty, the risk of longer term unemployment, and nominal rigidities. We have shown that, conditional upon real wage rigidity, these frictions can in conjunction create a vicious circle of feedback that leads to an ampli…cation mechanism that is neutralized when either prices are ‡exible or asset markets are complete.
In our analysis the risk of longer term unemployment is important for generating a sizeable response to labor market shocks. We have given no further structural interpretation the multiple unemployment states and it would be interesting to dig deeper and to examine the sources of this shock which we …nd is important quantitatively. In the same vein, it would be interesting to investigate further the sources of the initial increase in job separations.
A key aspect of the model that we examine is that the aggregate shocks to labor market conditions bring about idiosyncratic risk. Because workers do not know who will lose their jobs when the job separation rate increases, there is a link between aggregate shocks that impact on job prospects and idiosyncratic uncertainty. We think this is an interesting mechanism which would be worth exploring further.
There are many avenues for possible extensions of our analysis. In our model there is no aggregate savings vehicle. It would be interesting to include accumulable assets which could potentially introduce a propagation mechanism. Moreover, we have allowed only for shocks to job separations and to the share of unemployed workers ‡owing into the two states while individuals in reality face other shocks that may generate precautionary savings such as earnings uncertainty and health shocks. Furthermore, we have not allowed for idiosyncratic …rm risk which would be very interesting to study in our setting because it would potentially generate an alternative ampli…cation mechanism. We leave these and other extensions to future work.
Appendices

Krusell-Smith algorithm
To solve the model, we apply the algorithm of Krusell and Smith. In particular we assume that agents take as given a law of motion for the bond price. This law of motion is assumed linear in nine variables: the contemporaneous values of the two shocks, two lags of each shock, the lagged employment rate, the lagged measure of agents in the short-term pool, and the lagged bond price. 25 Taking as given this law of motion, we then solve the individuals'decision problems, simulate a continuum of agents and compute a time series for the bond price that would clear the bond market given decision rules. 26 We iterate until the law of motion taken as given coincides with the actual law of motion, up to an accuracy criterion.
Solving the individuals'problems
Our algorithm for solving the individual worker's problem is the following. First, we decision rules the bond holdings by households in the two employment states, denoted by b 0 (b t ; S t j n t = 0; I t = 1)
for the short-term unemployed and b 0 (b t ; S t j n t = 0; I t = 0) for the unemployed in the less search e¢ cient state. Next, consider N employed workers in some period t, with N being a …nite but reasonably large number (200 in our application). For any of these workers, we are free to set an initial level of bond holdings. The initial level of bond holdings of worker 1 is set to some b 0 that is likely to be at the lower end of the ergodic set. The level of bond holdings of any agent n > 1, is set to be the exactly amount of bond holdings chosen by agent n 1 in the previous period. Thus, we let period t's agent n be labeled as agent n + 1 in period t + 1. 25 We verify that this law of motion can accurately predict the contemporaneous bond price in the equilibrium. 26 We ensure market clearing in the simulation by following Den Haan and Rendahl (2010) who suggest to solve for a transformation of individual bond holdings instead for bond holdings itself. In particular they let agents solve for x i;t b i;t + q t where b i;t denotes individual bond holdings and q t denotes the bond price. In each simulation period, one can then compute the market clearing bond price by simply aggregating the choices for x i;t , using the fact that the aggregate net supply of bonds is zero.
the following system of budget constraints and Euler equations: 
Taking the aggregate variables as given, this is a dynamic system of 4N equations in 4N + 1 endogenous variables (c u 2;s;t ; :::; c N +1;s;t ; c u 2;l;t ; :::; c N +1;l;t ; b 1;t; :::; b N;t ; c 1;t ; :::; c N;t and c N +1;t ): How to close the system? Note that agent N was agent 1 in period t N: Thus, we can think of this agent as a very lucky one who has started of with wealth b 0 and has since remained employed for N consecutive periods. For any amount of b 0 that is part of the ergodic set, the agent is likely be among the very richest agents in the economy and will be extremely close to the amount of bond holdings that any agent will maximally chose. We can solve for the maximum amount of bond holdings and the associated level of consumption from the following equations, which resemble steady-state conditions: 
The above system represents the choices of a worker who happens to remain employed forever.
The di¤erence between this agent, and an agent who has remained employed for at least N periods can be made arbitrarily small by letting N grow large. Hence, we pin down c e N +1;t+1 by setting c N +1;t+1 = c max;t+1 :
We now have a dynamic system of 4N + 5 equations in 4N + 5 variables, which we solve using standard perturbation software.
Once the dynamic system is solved, we …t a (9th-order) polynomial that represents the decision rule of the employed worker, denoted by b 0 (b t ; S t j n t = 1). Next we turn to the two types of unemployed agents and solve systems similar to the one above. But now we take the decision rule of an employed agent for given and set the initial wealth of unemployment agent 1 to b max : Agent N is now an agent who has been unemployed for at at least N periods and will be at the very lower end of the wealth distribution. Hence, we pin down the system by solving for c u min;t , the consumption choice of an agent who has been unemployed for an in…nitely large number of time periods.
After the perturbation step, we update the policy rules for the unemployed agent and return to the employed agent's problem We keep on iterating on the agents until the maximum change in coe¢ cients of the …tted policy rules drops below a certain convergence criterion. 
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